Biological and Cultural Evolutionary Game Theory

http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/bb/berman/P4S3.htm

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-evolutionary/

Evolutionary game theory brings a mathematical tool to analyze the concept of evolution and survival of the fittest. The websites above question the rigidity of game theory when applied to the biological or cultural side of evolution. Using the prisoner’s dilemma as a model for behavior implies that there is an intrinsic selfishness in humans. This selfishness can be explained partly because of the human desire to live and to keep their species alive. The first website mentions the motherly tendency to sacrifice her own life for the safety of her children. This variance from the prisoner’s dilemma we studied is slight but does vary from the predicted outcomes of selfishness. Genetics definitely instills an innate drive to live, but humans use other cues like loyalty and love which undermine selfish strategies that might otherwise be predicted. The Prisoner’s Dilemma makes more sense when applied to survival of the species, if the desired outcome is not individual survival, but survival of one’s offspring. This model could then include other strategies, such as cooperation, morals, or charity, to name a few.

The second site begins to address this, describing how evolution in regard to game theory is not only biological, but that cultural evolution is also valid. The notion of changes in beliefs and cultural norms leads to the evolving and differing strategies of humans. Looking at evolutionary stable strategies provides some insight to biological behavior. For example, like we saw in class, proof of the hawk strategy being evolutionarily stable over the dove strategy can explain many predator-prey relationships in the natural world. But, it seems to be inconsistent with human tendencies. Studies show that changing the payoff matrix leads to different stable population outcomes. While one example may have the population leading to hawks, another may have a more fluctuating outcome. This spawns from the fact that humans do not have equivalent preferences and values, making Nash equilibrium difficult to calculate for some games, where rationality is not necessarily the deciding factor. The ability of humans to behave differently from genetics is shown through things like loyalty and altruism from cultural evolution, which change the expected behaviors of people in social networks. At a higher level, these differences in strategies within a network become a species survival strategy in itself as individuals try various ways to survive within a group.

Posted in Topics: Science, social studies

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