http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88030744

With Hillary Clinton refusing to drop out of the race and neither candidate looking likely to score the 2024 delegates needed to ensure the Democratic party’s presidential nomination, its looking more and more likely that the eventual nominee will be decided by a vote of the 794 super-delegates at the party’s August convention in Denver. These individuals have no formal obligation to vote in accordance with primary results in their particular state/district and can thus vote freely for the candidate of their choice. In some respects, the voting decisions of the super delegates and actions of the two candidates incorporate elements of game theory and strategic behavior. The link above is an NPR radio segment and text summary of an interview with game theory expert Jim Miller, a professor at Smith College, discussing some potential game theoretic political strategies and implications.

Of particular interest and relevance was the discussion of the voting motivations of the super delegates. Jim Miller suggests that instead of voting in the party’s best interest, some will no doubt instead weigh the potential rewards and punishments involved with choosing or not choosing one candidate over the other and thus vote to maximize their individual benefit. In this sense, to reduce the severity of negative political consequences, super delegates may be tempted to vote for the candidate perceived as being more vindictive; Hillary Clinton. While this sort of scenario might be difficult to represent as a simple game, it can be thought of as one and the strategy of voting for the tougher candidate to minimize possible personal fallout could be characterized as a maximin strategy.

Another possible interpretation of the race between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama is that they are competing against each other in a game where the payoffs are super delegates. Strategies and responses could be considered to be things like Clinton’s remarks about how Obama would make a good vice president, which have been seen as attempts to discredit the viability of his candidacy and sway super delegates to her side. Interestingly, Miller suggests that Obama best response to these offers would be to flat out reject them and the notion of a vice presidential bid, which he has since done. Similar sorts of delegate-persuading tactics on Obama’s part would include promoting the idea that he run on a third party ticket if not given the Democratic nomination and suggesting before the vote like he has been currently that any outcome in which the candidate with the most regular delegates and popular votes doesn’t receive the nomination would be tainted and illegitimate.