www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/05/BAGFVDQ1S.DTL  In 2005, Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize in Economics for, in the words of the Nobel committee, “having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.” Schelling is attributed to having helped the United States avoid nuclear warfare with the Soviets during the Cold War, and, once again, his strategies may be needed to spare the US from potential nuclear war, except this time, with Iran.  Current relations between the United States and Iran are in a most tumultuous state. Recently in the media, there have been many analysis of how the US can better use game theory to ease the growing tensions with Iran and prevent war between the two countries. As we have covered in class, game- theory is the way in which actors are influenced to make choices in game scenarios. Each choice made by the actors directly affects the decisions made by other actors in the scenario. To apply this explanation to the conflict between the United States and Iran, there have been statements made by the US, either through policy or verbal address that have led to subsequent reactions by Iran. In this article regarding weapons conflicts between the US and Iran, the theories of renowned economist and diplomatic analyst, Thomas Schelling, offer insight on how President Bush can utilize game theory to ameliorate tensions between the two countries. The discussion of these theories took place at UC Berkeley where Schelling and other esteemed experts shared their views on the current US- Iran conflict.  The best outcome for both sides is clearly a peaceful one, however, the current US strategy may not be promoting this conclusion.  Currently, the strategy of the US has been to threaten Iran with attack if their pursuit of nuclear weapons continues. The security dilemma between the two countries exists in a heightened state due to the extremely destructive power of nuclear weapons. In hopes to deter Iran from continuing steps toward nuclear production, President Bush has recently been implying that the US will use necessary force in order to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. To contradict this aggressive US strategy, Schelling argues that US threats only increase Iran’s desire for nuclear capabilities. The public threats made by the US may seem like a reasonable strategy due to their objective of keeping Iran a non-nuclear state, however, this aggressive is only dominant when the threats act as a deterrent. In Schelling’s analysis, it seems that US threats act not to deter Iran’s nuclear interests, but quite conversely, encourage them. This fits with one of Schelling’s most acclaimed theories, that extreme threats or policies can backfire.Therefor, according to Schelling, with a more diplomatic approach, the US could not only facilitate a more effective means to ending the conflict, but also peacefully ease Iran’s desire to become a nuclear power. www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/05/BAGFVDQ1S.DTL