http://www.jstor.org/view/0361915x/di010136/01p0124k/0 While reading some of the posts written over the past couple of weeks, I came across one about the relationships between the Cold War arms race and game theory. After taking a class last year on British Foreign policy, I remembered a different kind of war that the game theory we discussed in class could be applied too. Sure enough, after a quick search on JSTOR, I tracked down an article that was pretty much exactly what I was looking for.While it is rather old, Levhari and Mirman’s paper does a good job of applying the Nash guidelines to a then-current issue. In the article, the authors build a model based on the international fishing market between Iceland and the United Kingdom in the late 70’s. In this game, the two nations are trying to maximize their own ‘discounted sum of utilities’; simply defined, this is the profit of each country considering all externalities (i.e. the change in market price caused by their opponent’s catch and the future fish population). Furthermore, each player is fully aware of the other’s actions, and reacts accordingly. Surprisingly, in the competitive solution solved by the authors the fish population has a tendency to grow towards infinity, while the Nash Equilibrium entails an increase in consumption by both players, forcing the stock closer to extinction. These solutions are influential to both the U.K. and Iceland on a social and economic level. Rather than encouraging more competition between the nations for fishing rights in international waters, the paper proves that collusion between the two players will maximize profit for both parties. Subsequently, their paper sets the groundwork for future analysis of natural resource disputes; while the conflict is indeed simplified, the model created can be used to help ease tension and even solve other international conflicts.