As the Democratic primary wears on, followers of the news have been inundated with reports about the special, uncommitted delegates who may end up playing a critical role in the nomination. These 796 “superdelegates” are national party members and elected officials who have been under intense media scrutiny and campaigns’ pressures to endorse. In a nation-wide race for a nomination, it is this select group that plays an important gatekeeper role. Their decisions can determine the outcome of the nomination and the future of their own careers. Delegates are under a great deal of pressure to support the candidate that they believe will be the best nominee and also to follow the will of their area’s voters.

In a slate article called “What’s a Superdelegate To Do?” [http://www.slate.com/id/2184677] Jeff Greenfield writes that delegates face down this choice philosophically and pragmatically. It is a game theory situation where the players must make their move uncertain what the others will do. If a delegate votes against the will of the people in his or her district they face severe scrutiny and pressure from hometown officials. They would hope that all other superdelegates decide to vote in a similar fashion so that they have political cover when they return home. Furthermore, the campaigns make the arguments that  voting the way districts voted benefits Obama, while voting the way that previous arrangements and concepts of best leader (which also contains a good deal of self-interest by the delegate for favors or fear of reprisals) benefits Clinton. So the superdelegates must hope to play the game the same way most others do so that their candidate is the eventual nominee. If they play the game differently than others, say by favoring Obama when the rest go to Clinton, they risk the strain in relationship with the supporters of the future president.

The article mentions John Rawls’ “veils of ignorance” which must be used when playing this game. Considering the two strategies for how to vote, superdelegates must vote in a way that disregards the benefit of supporting one candidate over another personally and rather vote as if they had no idea what the consequences would be. The likelihood of Rawls’ philosophy being on the agenda when the delegates meet in August is low. More realistic, both campaigns will scramble to make their case to the public and to the delegates the costs and benefits of each strategy. I predict that as the values of the moves in the game change with daily polls and primary wins, eventually a Nash equilibrium will be reached where a majority of superdelegates see the wisdom in one choice over another and begin a wholesale move toward the winning candidate. It is up to the campaigns to figure out how to entice and convince the delegates that their option is a winning move.