Evolutionary Game Theory and Nuclear Politics

Three years before the Cuban Missile Crisis, noted philosopher Bertrand Russell compared nuclear brinkmanship to a game of Chicken; the idea that superpowers should stockpile nuclear weapons and make generally vague yet scary threats against each other in order to create situations more advantageous to them was analogous to two reckless car drivers waiting until the last moment to swerve out of the way. Events like the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how dangerous waiting until reaching the verge of severe global conflict could be during the Cold War. This power play between the two superpowers can be described in more economic terms as a game, with severely negative payoffs if both players choose the aggressive strategy, and not particularly exciting results if both players choose the safe one.

While the Cold War has ended, the concept of nuclear weapons as deterrents has not, and many more recently modernized nations are hoping to add themselves to the list of nuclear powers. With so-called “rogue nations” such as North Korea and Iran, the issue is often more one of diplomatic negotiation and empty threats than a serious prelude to nuclear war. That said, the diplomatic negotiations can often seem like a game of Chicken between a monster truck and a motorcycle. Naturally the US and Europe don’t want new nuclear powers with their own agendas, but, likewise, cannot seem to be capitulating too quickly to their demands. Likewise, a rogue nation’s leader cannot wither under international pressure and expect to keep the respect of his country’s population. Both parties make decisions on how to proceed with negotiations by analyzing which negotiation strategy will likely give them a better payoff in the future, and, when an evolutionarily stable strategy is found (like, say, multilateral negotiations) the situations can be resolved.

Expecting countries at opposite ends of the negotiating table to act unselfishly is a bit of a stretch. Here’s to hoping that, at the very least, evolutionarily stable strategies can be found where all parties involved, at the very least, can escape a conflict without dire consequences.

Posted in Topics: Education

Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.

Comments are closed.



* You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed.