Cheating - Not an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

Cheaters and Chumps: Game Theorists Offer a Surprising Insight Into the Evolution of Fair Play

Cooperation has long been prevalent in human civilization and society. This article sets up an example in which both players cooperating are rewarded, and both players cheating do poorly, while one player cheating and one attempting to cooperate gives the largest possible reward to the cheater, and no reward for the player cooperating, similar to the situation of the prisoner’s dilemma. Seeing cheating and cooperating as strategies similar to the example of the hawk/dove situation that was discussed in class, one may assume that cheating is an evolutionarily stable strategy. A population of cheaters may not fare well when compared with a population of cheaters, but they would fare better than if they were a cooperator among cheaters (detailed as the “what-a-chump scenario” by the author.

However, altruism and cooperation are prevalent in modern times, and this article proposes an explanation as to why cooperation as a trait is not simply modeled by the hawk/dove example. The author cites studies where participants will punish cheaters – even at the expense of their own reward, with the motive of revenge, from a sense of justice. Assuming that this sense of justice and altruism is a genetic trait, there must be a genetic basis for it being maintained in the population.

So, if random acts of cooperation do not pay off, what is wrong with comparing cooperation with the hawk/dove example? The author cites genetic-relatedness, which may breed familial cooperation. This could provide a basic unit from which cooperation could evolve, by self-interactions. Exclusion of selfish/cheating individuals forces competition of cheaters with each other, while cooperators interact with each other, skewing rewards to those cooperating. These interactions may not be one-shot deals, and as such, cheaters may be identified and ostracized, further preventing the one-sided cheater/cooperator interactions. Repeated interactions with punishments for cheaters both deters cheaters, and allows for “potential payback” The author cites that society has even fostered relatedness unwittingly to forge cooperation, with examples of the army supporting a brotherhood-like bond, and an effect of teams forming substitutes for familial relationships.

Posted in Topics: Education

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