Growing Networks

In a previous post, rebelkingismyhero discussed a model of large scale networks called the random graph. A random graph/network is generated by connecting each pair of a number of vertices with some probability. This creates a graph with each vertex having the same connectivity or level of connectedness on average. rebelkingismyhero noted that the behavior of many networks in the real world do not seem to match this model.

I really enjoyed reviewing Barabasi and Albert’s paper “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks” which expands the random graph model to allow for growth in the network. Previously the number of vertices in a graph was fixed at the outset of the simulation. Barabasi et al. tries to instead mimic real world systems which continuously expand. Their model starts with an initial number of vertices and then links a new vertex to some of the old vertices each time step. To determine which vertices the new vertex will attach to, Barabasi incorporates ‘preferential attachment’ i.e. a vertex is more likely to attach to a popular vertex that has many edges than an edge that has only a few. The networks that result are similar to well documented networks such as the web and citation patterns in journals in that they self-organize into a network with ‘hubs’ and have connectivity that follows a power law.

In class we have studied networks that are static. I find it interesting to think about how the networks we have used to study power imbalances would grow if we used Barabasi’s technique to expand the network. How would the network evolve if we allowed vertices with power below a certain threshold to ‘die’? Should we modify the definition of ‘preferential attachment’ to have a new vertex prefer connecting to powerful vertices rather than well connected ones? Perhaps the ‘balanced outcomes’ discussed in lecture would move away from extreme imbalances and instead move toward a more even distribution of power. I think that it is likely that individual ‘agents’ ‘ attachment preferences must be at work when you examine how social networks, trading markets, and even bone tissue grows. These personal preferences may influence the global behavior of a network. Likewise, perhaps the overall function of a network or the environment in which it grows dictates how a new vertex attaches to the rest of the network.

With the dynamic nature of the real world, studying how a network’s structure changes over time could be as important as studying the network’s structure itself.

Posted in Topics: General, Mathematics

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3 Responses to “Growing Networks”

  1. Article Feed » Growing Networks Says:

    […] Original post by Spero and a wordpress plugin by Elliott […]

  2. Cornell Info 204 Digest » Blog Archive » Combinatorial auctions, fairness in games and growth in networks Says:

    […] Fifo writes about combinatorial auctions in which the sellers has many objects to sell and the buyers are interested in buying packages of objects. The idea is that a buyer’s value for one object depends on whether or not he wins another object and this makes the problem is much more complex than the auctions we have talked about in class. Interestingly, with a bit of generalization, Vickery’s results on second-price auctions also solve a simple version of this problem with independent values. If bidders bid on all packages of objects then in a second-price-like auction, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy. Many issues remain because this auction may be too complex to actually run, values may not be simple and they may not be easy access. The extension of the Vickery auction that solves the problem is called a Vickery-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We will discuss this mechanism later in the course. […]

  3. Cornell Info 204 - Networks » Blog Archive » Interplay between Network Structure and Evolutionary Game Theory Says:

    […] Previous studies found that the role of spatially structured populations (much like the ones we have been studying in class) on the emergence of cooperation varied from game to game. In contrast, this study actually found that when networks were grown using Barabasi’s preferential attachment model (described previously and in class) cooperation becomes a predominant trait for both games on both large and small networks at equilibrium independent of how the relative payoffs are set. The explanation proposed that hubs within the network are havens for cooperators. As the hubs are highly interconnected, they resist invasion by lone defectors. They found that if they removed the age-correlations that Barabasi’s model encourages then cooperation is less prevalent. […]



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