The article above is from August 2006 and discusses the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The subheading, “Can game theory solve the Israel-Lebanon war?” sounds hopeful, but the article downplays game theory’s ability to analyze political situations. It discusses prisoner’s dilemma, which it describes as an oversimplified model that is “too seductive.” One reason is that Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two-player game, and political and social arrangements involve third parties.

One interesting topic that this article discusses is Prisoner’s Dilemma as an iterated game. It mentions that game theorists have known that players may use cooperative strategies if the game is repeated. Many people believe that cooperative strategies work because of “tit for tat,” where a prisoner who confesses is punished in the next round. The article calls “tit for tat” a “poster child” that does not accurately describe real situations. It also does not describe the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah because there are multiple players and asymmetry between the players.

I do agree with the article that “tit for tat” oversimplifies real situations, but I do think that “tit for tat” explains why cooperative strategies can occur in repeated games of prisoner’s dilemma. In a repeated game of prisoner’s dilemma, if either player decides to confess, the other will respond by confessing. This ensures that neither player confesses so that over long periods of time, both players’ payoffs are maximized. In a conflict between two groups or countries, it is probably hard to apply “tit for tat” because cooperative strategies do not always satisfy both countries. However, “tit for tat” does show how an offensive strategy like confessing or launching an attack might cause the other player to adopt the same strategy. The result is chaos because neither side trusts the other to cooperate.