Comments on: Online & Board Games Have Interesting Variations of Traditional Auction Types http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836 This is a supplemental blog for a course which will cover how the social, technological, and natural worlds are connected, and how the study of networks sheds light on these connections. Fri, 08 Mar 2013 14:27:53 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.3.3 By: Cornell Info 204 Digest » Blog Archive » All-Pay Auctions, Evolutionary Game Theory and Visualizing Networks http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1262 Cornell Info 204 Digest » Blog Archive » All-Pay Auctions, Evolutionary Game Theory and Visualizing Networks Sun, 11 Mar 2007 03:53:23 +0000 http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1262 [...] In a recent post tekhn3 mentioned an interesting auction type that we have not discussed in class. It seems to be a form of an all-pay auction. In an all-pay auction every bidder pays their bid, but only the highest bidder wins the good being sold. Lobbying can be viewed as an all-pay auction as every lobbyist pays, but only one is successful. You might think that since very bidder pays, the seller would generate more revenue with this form of auction than with a second price auction. But optimal bids are very different here than in a second price auction. In particular, bidding your true value is obviously not an optimal strategy in this auction. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem shows that expected seller revenue is the same for an all-pay auction as for a second price auction (or a first price auction). A good reference for this is the on-line book by Paul Klemperer. [...] […] In a recent post tekhn3 mentioned an interesting auction type that we have not discussed in class. It seems to be a form of an all-pay auction. In an all-pay auction every bidder pays their bid, but only the highest bidder wins the good being sold. Lobbying can be viewed as an all-pay auction as every lobbyist pays, but only one is successful. You might think that since very bidder pays, the seller would generate more revenue with this form of auction than with a second price auction. But optimal bids are very different here than in a second price auction. In particular, bidding your true value is obviously not an optimal strategy in this auction. The Revenue Equivalence Theorem shows that expected seller revenue is the same for an all-pay auction as for a second price auction (or a first price auction). A good reference for this is the on-line book by Paul Klemperer. […]

]]> By: shadejon http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1261 shadejon Mon, 05 Mar 2007 10:23:22 +0000 http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1261 Hi, Shannon is a guy, by the way. Yehuda Hi,

Shannon is a guy, by the way.

Yehuda

]]> By: auction - steer clear http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1260 auction - steer clear Sun, 04 Mar 2007 19:38:17 +0000 http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1260 [...] Online & Board Games Have Interesting Variations of Traditional Auction Types The particular part of Shannon Applecline s Social Gaming Interactions, Part Two: Competition which pertains most to the material in this class is what she describes as the most exciting competition, the economic competition involving auctions. Especially of interest is the variations on common auction types which these games display, and how auctions traditionally held in reality are represented in digital form. Take the Dutch auction for example. This is easily digitally modeled in Merchants of Amsterdam with a clock which counts back and reduces the price simultaneously. First-degree price discrimination is displayed in Queen s Necklace, which has a turn-based Dutch auction where players buy a small quantity of some item when they can afford it, and in the next round, prices drop and the game continues. Interesting variations of auctions are sometimes done at the expense of the bidder. The reason for this is to curb devaluation of currency, which is quite rampant in online games. Fist of The Dragonstones uses a sealed-bid auction where all bids are spent and only the winner gets the item. New England displays a typical English auction with a twist, players only bid in certain rounds and have to pay in order to bid in earlier bidding rounds. Another solution to the devaluation of currency is displayed in Res Publica, where a seller offers an item, and bidders offer other items in trade or a bidder requests an item and sellers offer items. As a creative medium, games should continue to offer new and interesting variations of commonly used auction techniques. [...] […] Online & Board Games Have Interesting Variations of Traditional Auction Types The particular part of Shannon Applecline s Social Gaming Interactions, Part Two: Competition which pertains most to the material in this class is what she describes as the most exciting competition, the economic competition involving auctions. Especially of interest is the variations on common auction types which these games display, and how auctions traditionally held in reality are represented in digital form. Take the Dutch auction for example. This is easily digitally modeled in Merchants of Amsterdam with a clock which counts back and reduces the price simultaneously. First-degree price discrimination is displayed in Queen s Necklace, which has a turn-based Dutch auction where players buy a small quantity of some item when they can afford it, and in the next round, prices drop and the game continues. Interesting variations of auctions are sometimes done at the expense of the bidder. The reason for this is to curb devaluation of currency, which is quite rampant in online games. Fist of The Dragonstones uses a sealed-bid auction where all bids are spent and only the winner gets the item. New England displays a typical English auction with a twist, players only bid in certain rounds and have to pay in order to bid in earlier bidding rounds. Another solution to the devaluation of currency is displayed in Res Publica, where a seller offers an item, and bidders offer other items in trade or a bidder requests an item and sellers offer items. As a creative medium, games should continue to offer new and interesting variations of commonly used auction techniques. […]

]]> By: Funny Games » Online & Board Games Have Interesting Variations of Traditional … http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1259 Funny Games » Online & Board Games Have Interesting Variations of Traditional … Sun, 04 Mar 2007 19:22:13 +0000 http://nsdl.library.cornell.edu/websites/expertvoices/info2040/archives/1836#comment-1259 [...] Original post by t3khn3 and software by Elliott [...] […] Original post by t3khn3 and software by Elliott […]

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